"Most of the change we think we see in life is due to truths being in and out of favor." --Robert Lee Frost

BUSTING HEDGE FUNDS (December 17, 2023): I had worked at Thomson Reuters for 16-1/2 years; the person sitting next to me had the responsibility of tracking hedge funds and reporting on their behavior. After doing this job for a couple of decades, he pointed out to me how the vast majority of hedge funds which had shown little correlation in their investing behavior through the early 1990s had become increasingly alike by the second decade of this century. The proliferation of hedge-fund conferences where they discussed their "best ideas," combined with nearly identical computer algorithms and momentum strategies becoming increasingly much more popular, almost totally displaced former tendencies toward value investing and identifying compelling bargains.

Although there remain key exceptions including money managed by Seth Klarman, Marc Faber, Jim Rogers, Howard Marks, Ray Dalio, and some others where it is unlikely that you will be able to have them handle your accounts, more than 90% of hedge funds are crowding into identical concepts at any given time. This herd following is especially prevalent at key extremes and has almost certainly caused many of those extremes to become much more exaggerated than they would have been if they hadn't existed. It is also increasingly the case that hedge funds as a group are doing almost exactly the opposite of top corporate insiders and commercials. Thus, tracking insider behavior and the traders' commitments has demonstrated repeated multi-decade extremes where the insiders and commercials are heavily on one side while hedge funds have been piling even more aggressively the other way.

Doing the same as insiders and commercials and the opposite of hedge funds has become an increasingly available and profitable investing strategy which I have been doing more consistently as the 21st century has progressed.

As a result, the most consistently successful strategy in the 21st century has been to do whatever the insiders and commercials are doing at any rare extreme, while going against the hedge funds. During the past year we have already seen several examples of this behavior with hedge funds establishing an all-time record short position in U.S. Treasuries in October 2023. This was followed by the biggest Treasury rally in four decades which intensified during the past week as hedge funds rushed to close out their shorts ahead of all the other hedge funds, and were not particularly successful in doing so. TLT had traded at 81.92 in the pre-market session on October 23, 2022, and less than two months later was trading above 99.

Hedge funds piling into the AI bubble is their latest extremely overcrowded trade, while the top corporate insiders of these companies have done all-time record selling of their shares.

The latest overcrowding by hedge funds has been in being long AI stocks. While most U.S. and global stocks and their funds including IWM have been in bear markets since they had topped out in November 2021, funds which are concentrated in the biggest and most popular megacaps which have generated the most investor excitement in this year's AI bubble have dramatically outperformed in spite of their unimpressive profit growth. QQQ has almost regained its all-time top, while XLK and SMH are among those funds which have experienced the greatest percentage gains during the past year and have achieved new record highs. The top insiders of these companies have never sold more aggressively than they have done during the past few years, while the only time hedge funds had been more committed to any concept was when they had been massively short U.S. Treasuries in October 2023.

This chart, just updated, highlights the amazing recent overcrowding by hedge funds into QQQ and Nasdaq 100 futures which has achieved an overwhelmingly lopsided extreme by a large factor even when compared with 2021 or 2022:

Less historically extreme but still massive overcrowding has created other 2023 situations ripe for busting.

Hedge funds, as is evidenced by the official exchange data at cftc.gov, had never demonstrated a higher ratio of shorts to longs for palladium, thereby leading to PALL plummeting to 85.25 at 12:06 p.m. on December 5, 2023. Since then it has rebounded above 100. Hedge funds piled massively into gold on Sunday evening, December 3, 2023 to reach a spot price of 2137.50 U.S. dollars per troy ounce for the first time in history. Given how hedge fund crowding leads to huge reversals, gold bullion is likely to drop to around 1750 during the next several months before enjoying its next strong rally. The traders' commitments for gold as of December 5, 2023 showed commercials (who are those that own physical gold, such as miners, jewelers, and fabricators) long 103,193 contracts and short 330,138 which is more than 3:1 short to long. Not surprisingly, almost all of those on the other side of this trade were hedge funds and related managed money organizations which the commodity exchange calls "large speculators."

Silver's commitments the same week showed commercials long 40,974 and short 92,988 which was clearly also bearish for silver. Hedge funds were thus aggressively long gold and silver and even more aggressively short palladium. Palladium commercials that week were long 12,814 and short 1,537 which is more than 8:1 long to short.

Hedge funds had done all-time record crowding into shorting the Japanese yen, enabling the yen to fall to its lowest point since July-August 1990. Since then the yen, which trades as an exchange-traded fund via FXY, has experienced its strongest short-term rebound since the Bretton Woods agreement was terminated over a half century ago.

Hedge funds formed a lesser bubble by massively overcrowding into energy commodities and their shares two months ago.

Several times since November 2022 including around the middle of September 2023, hedge funds massively crowded into anything relating to energy while energy insiders sold shares at their most intense pace ever recorded. This was an especially notable reversal for top energy executives who in 2020 were their most aggressive in buying their own shares in their entire history. Starting on September 14, 2023, when XLE reached an all-time dividend-adjusted zenith of 93.685, energy shares and their funds including XLE have been among the biggest losers of all unleveraged exchange-traded funds in any sector.

The media often encourage ordinary investors to do as the hedge funds are doing, which is not surprising since they get a lot of their information from hedge funds which are naturally trying to get others to follow whatever will benefit their own portfolios.

Why have the media suddenly been talking about a "Fed pivot?" It's not because financial journalists have suddenly discovered how to interpret whatever the Fed has been doing. It is because they receive a lot of their data and even more of their interpretation of that data from hedge funds which naturally want to get retail investors to pile into their largest positions. In addition, whenever any asset is especially popular or depressed, the media will seek out stories which will allegedly explain "why" U.S. Treasury yields will keep climbing even when they are at their highest levels since 2000 (as in October 2023) or why AI stocks will keep rising regardless of how overpriced they are (as in December 2023). If you follow the media then you will repeatedly buy near each top and sell near each bottom.

The current U.S. equity bear market is following its usual sequence of sector bottoms.

The Russell 2000 and nearly all related funds such as IWM, along with most stocks worldwide which are unrelated to the AI bubble, have been in notable bear markets since their November 2021 tops, on average losing about 20% of their value during the past 25 months. Before any U.S. equity bear market intensifies, as the current one will almost certainly do soon, we have a sequence of historic sector bottoms which are completed in the following order: 1) U.S. Treasuries which probably completed their nadirs in October 2023 and are in major uptrends; 2) gold mining and silver mining shares which I expect will bottom around the spring of 2024 before initiating powerful rebounds; 3) emerging-market stocks and bonds which will perhaps bottom around the summer of 2024 with Chinese shares notably underpriced and which could thereby become compelling bargains at that time; 4) non-precious commodity producers which might also gain by substantial percentages after they bottom later in 2024; 5) special situations which vary from one bear market to another. In this case, the sectors which could approach multi-year lows in 2024 and thereafter rally strongly might include currently unpopular biotech shares and their funds like XBI along with airline shares and their funds including JETS.

I also plan to be open-minded about other sectors becoming worthwhile for purchase sometime during 2024.

The ultimate bottoms for most AI shares won't occur until 2025 or 2026.

As a general rule, those shares which achieve historic bubbles tend to lose over 80% of their value and to take two to three years to complete their total downtrends. After QQQ had topped out on March 10, 2000, it lost 83.6% of its value by the time it bottomed exactly 31 months later on October 10, 2002 (see stockcharts.com which includes all reinvested dividends by default). If QQQ loses 83.6% of its recent high of 406.5, which could potentially go even higher in the short run, then this would mean an eventual QQQ bottom of 66.666 which looks to me like a very lucky number indeed.

The bottom line: An increasingly profitable strategy during the 21st century capitalizes on the tendency of the vast majority of hedge funds to use momentum methods and to thereby overcrowd massively into various positions. Top corporate insiders and commercials throughout various points in 2023 have been doing almost exactly the opposite of those hedge funds near all key extremes for a wide variety of assets including AI stocks in December (QQQ,SLK,SMH), U.S. Treasuries in October (TLT), the Japanese yen in November (FXY), large-cap energy shares in September (XLE), and all precious metals in early December including palladium (PALL), gold (GLD), and silver (SLV). You can therefore consistently make money, although not always immediately, by following the insiders and commercials and doing the exact opposite of the most overcrowded hedge-fund concentrations during the next several years.

Disclosure of current holdings:

Below is my current asset allocation as of 4:00 p.m. on Friday, December 22, 2023. Each position is listed as its percentage of my total liquid net worth.

I computed the exact totals for each position and grouped these according to sector.

The order is as follows: 1) U.S. government bonds; 2) shorts; 3) bear funds; 4) gold/silver mining; 5) coins; 6) miscellaneous securities.

VMFXX/TIAA(Traditional)bank CDs/FZDXX/FZFXX/SPRXX/SPAXX/Savings/Checking long: 36.32%;

26-Week/17-Week/52-Week/13-Week/2-Year/8-Week/3-Year/5,10-Year TIPS/4-Week/42-Day long: 21.66%;

TLT long: 11.67%;

I Bonds long: 10.54%;

PMM long: 0.01%;

XLK short (all shorts once again unhedged): 28.39%;

QQQ short: 17.23%;

XLE short: 5.15%;

XLI short: 2.77%;

XLV short: 1.69%;

SMH short: 1.01%;

AAPL short: 0.02%;

SARK long: 0.90%;

PSQ long: 0.03%;

PALL long: 0.20%;

GDXJ long: 0.14% (fully hedged with out-of-the-money covered calls);

Gold/silver/platinum coins: 6.28%;

FXY long: 0.17%;

PAK long: 0.03%.

"Successful investing is about recognizing the widest gaps between fair value and present value." --Steven Jon Kaplan

BABY DONE, MAMA NEXT (November 27, 2022): All we really need to know we learned in kindergarten, including the story of Goldilocks and the Three Bears. 2021 was Goldilocks and 2022 was Baby Bear, so 2023 will be Mama Bear and 2024 will be Papa Bear. If you can remember this then you will invest far better than most grownups.

2022 was a classic first year of a bear market with familiar themes from similar past bear markets.

Bear markets are much more similar to each other than bull markets. We experienced a large-cap growth stock bubble one year ago which was very similar to the bubbles of September 1929, January 1973, and March 2020. Just as in those three previous periods from the past century, the large-cap growth shares which caused the bubble in the first place mostly dropped in 2022 about twice as much as the average U.S. stock during the past year just as they had done in 2000. We also had three sharp bounces along the way, including the current one which began around the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2022. It is therefore logical to assume that 2023 will be similar to a year like 2001, with generally steeper losses during each downtrend along with stronger bounces in between downtrends and probably with a moderately larger total loss for 2023 compared with 2022.

Throughout 2022 the U.S. dollar, emerging-market securities, and highly-speculative assets (think cryptocurrencies) also behaved as they generally do during the first year of major bear markets.

VIX and TLT varied from the usual script throughout 2022.

Two interesting differences from analogous past bear markets included 1) the failure of VIX to reach 40 throughout 2022; and 2) the dramatic weakness for U.S. Treasuries and their funds including TLT which dropped about twice as much as they usually would during the first downward phase of a bear market. Since we had more net inflows into the U.S. stock market in 2021 than during 2001 through 2020 combined (not a misprint), presumably these tardy buyers included many less-experienced investors who are not familiar with bear markets.

I expect U.S. Treasuries and VIX to surge sharply higher during the first half of 2023, partly to compensate for their overdone 2022 weaknesses.

In a bear market you can make money selling short on the way down while purchasing U.S. Treasuries and gold/silver mining shares along with other deeply-oversold securities near each intermediate-term bottom.

Selling short the most-overpriced U.S. large-cap equity funds will likely continue to be a winning approach which you can enhance by periodically selling covered puts against these whenever VIX is beginning another retreat. This can be enhanced by adding to the most undervalued long positions whenever there is the least insider selling and the greatest outflows by the least-experienced investors. U.S. Treasuries and gold/silver mining shares in particular tend to enjoy net gains even with sharp corrections during these kinds of bear markets; look at a chart of VUSTX (long-term Treasuries) or $HUI (gold/silver mining shares) from 2000 through 2003. I have therefore been adding to both of these sectors during their most depressed periods of 2022.

Closed-end funds often provide outsized bargains during intermediate- and long-term bear market bottoming patterns.

Some investors aren't as familiar with closed-end funds as they are with open-end or exchange-traded funds. Especially during bear markets, closed-end funds are often sold by those who are disappointed or discouraged or who are otherwise emotionally unhappy about holding anything which has dropped for two years or longer. This causes many closed-end funds to sell at higher discounts to net asset value than they experience during bull markets.

In February 2009, near the end of the severe 2007-2009 bear market, I went to Cefa.com and ranked all closed-end funds from highest discount to lowest. By the middle of the ninth page the discount finally dropped below 20%. When I did the same test in January 2010, less than a year later but when fear of losing more money had been replaced by fear of missing out on additional gains, the discount dropped below 20% halfway down the very first page. This means that the number of closed-end funds with high discounts was 17 times as high in February 2009 as it was in January 2010.

It is especially likely that the next market bottom following a "Mama Bear" retreat, perhaps around the middle of 2023, could be accompanied by very high discounts for some worthwhile closed-end funds. Select those where the fund manager(s) have their own money in the fund, where they have been managing the fund for several years or longer, which have relatively low expense ratios, and which rely on value investing principles rather than using leverage or other financial tricks to enhance their performance.

Value investing is once again taking over from growth as these major groups take turns outperforming through the decades.

The following chart highlights the see-saw behavior of value vs. growth investing since 1975:

I expect value shares to lose much less than growth shares on the way down for a couple of years, just as value had lost much less overall in 2022, and to gain substantially more on the way up for five or six years during the next major bull market (2025 through 2030, approximately).

Differentiation is clearly underway.

In my last update I forecast that investors would begin to differentiate among sectors, so that not all shares would go up or down by similar percentages. This has been increasingly prevalent in recent months as gold mining and silver mining shares and some emerging markets have been far outgaining large-cap U.S. growth favorites from 2020-2021. Part of the critical shift from growth to value will be the increasing outperformance of small caps versus large caps, emerging markets versus U.S. securities, mining shares versus technology, and in general the big winners of 2000-2008 trouncing the big winners from 2009-2021.

It is okay to be a Boglehead with assets which may have completed their cycle bottoms including government bonds and gold/silver mining shares. It's not okay to be a Boglehead with SPY, QQQ, or any collection of previous large-cap U.S. growth favorites.

Why did U.S. large-cap growth stocks perform so well in 2021? It wasn't because their profits increased faster than the profits of other sectors. The primary reason by far is that we had the biggest-ever inflow of inexperienced investors in 2021 who in many cases had never invested in anything before. Being unfamiliar with the financial markets, they invested in names they knew from their everyday lives regardless of how overpriced they had become, and therefore created unsustainable bubbles. Just as a hangover must result from having far too much alcohol, 2022-2024 is the inevitable morning-after resolution of 2021. All of those big-name U.S. technology shares have to go back to fair value and probably well below, since bear markets usually end with an average 30% to 50% discount to fair value for these shares.

Dollar-cost averaging is not a worthwhile approach for any overpriced asset class. You might lose less on the way down but it will still represent a huge overall loss.

I am gradually adding to my short positions and reducing my long positions during the upcoming month to restore their balance from the middle of August 2022.

At the end of September and the beginning of October 2022 I sold covered puts and added significantly to all of my long positions in order to create a much heavier weighting of longs versus shorts compared with their mid-August interrelationship. Now that VIX has retreated almost all the way to 20, I plan to use the next few weeks, especially shortly after the opening bell into all upward spikes, to progressively reduce my long positions except for U.S. Treasuries and gold/silver mining shares and to add to my short positions in XLI, XLE, SMH, QQQ, and XLK. You can't make as big a percentage gain by selling short as you can by being long, but in a bear market the most consistent gains will almost always be on the short side.

XLI and XLE are new short positions, with SMH possibly joining them soon.

I began to sell short XLE when it had first reached 93 a couple of weeks ago, and I have been more recently selling short XLI at 101 and above. Both of these sectors are among those which have more than doubled from their respective March 2020 bottoms, have experienced intense selling of their components by top corporate executives, have enjoyed massive net inflows in recent weeks, and frequently climb shortly after the opening bell most days which is when the least-experienced investors do a large percentage of their total trading. SMH has experienced a sharp bounce in recent weeks so I may begin selling it short soon. If QQQ approaches 300 and especially if it surpasses that level, it is also worth adding to my already-existing position.

I'll take the over on the duration of this bear market.

Many investors believe that either the current U.S. equity bear market has ended or that it will terminate within a year or so. In my opinion that's not likely and I'll happily take the "over" on that bet. The earliest the current bear market could end, based upon the experience with all past lengthy bull markets (the bull market ending in January 2022 had begun in March 2009), would be in the summer of 2024 and that is probably too early by some unknown number of months.

I'm sure that by the time the current bear market has ended, I'll be losing plenty of money on the long side from having gotten invested far too soon and too high.

Old-fashioned savers can get their best deals from U.S. government bonds, especially U.S. Treasuries of 26 weeks, 52 weeks, 2 years, and 3 years until maturity.

Most investors are unaware that U.S. Treasuries have been sporting their highest yields since the summer of 2007. You can get over 4.7% on some securities and over 4% even on the shortest 4-week Treasuries. A good place to do this is TreasuryDirect.gov which charges no fees and allows you to participate in the same auctions as multi-billion-dollar institutions.

The bottom line: 2023 will resemble 2022 but with larger percentage pullbacks, bigger rebounds, and outperformance by U.S. Treasuries and gold/silver mining shares.

As we transition from the first to the second year of a three-year U.S. equity bear market we are likely to have a similar transition as we had experienced in 2000 to 2001. Mama Bear will rip apart large-cap U.S. growth shares, but will be considerably gentler to safe-haven assets including U.S. Treasuries along with gold mining and silver mining shares; Baby Bear in his inexperience treated almost all assets the same (i.e., not with care). In addition to selling short, put lots of money into 26-week, 52-week, 2-year, and 3-year U.S. Treasuries which have enjoyed their highest yields since the summer of 2007.

Disclosure of current holdings:

Here is my current asset allocation as of the close on Wednesday, November 23, 2022:

TIAA(Traditional)/VMFXX/FZDXX/Savings/Checking long: 30.97%;

XLK short (all shorts currently unhedged): 18.84%;

QQQ short: 6.71%;

XLE short: 4.90%;

XLI short: 0.64% (November 25 close);

TSLA short: 0.35%;

GDXJ long: 10.40%;

ASA long: 5.93%;

GDX long: 2.74%;

BGEIX long: 1.34%;

I Bonds long: 8.95%;

TLT long: 8.78%;

2-Year/3-Year/52-Week/26-Week/13-Week/5-Year TIPS long: 7.76%;

Gold/silver/platinum coins: 5.54%;

INTC long: 2.34%;

TKC long: 2.33%;

GEO long: 1.87%;

TEI long: 1.42%;

KWEB long: 1.32%;

FXY long: 0.85%;

FXB long: 0.18%;

FXF long: 0.17%;

VZ long: 0.65%;

EPOL long: 0.34%;

T long: 0.22%;

WBD long: 0.20%;

HBI long: 0.11%;

LEMB long: 0.06%;

PCY long: 0.05%;

NGL.PR.B long: 0.02%;

CEE long: 0.02%.

The numbers add up to more than 100% because short positions only require about 30% to hold them with no margin required.