Showing posts with label bubble. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bubble. Show all posts

Sunday, September 14, 2025

"The most important quality for an investor is temperament, not intellect." --Warren Buffett

THE GRAND ILLUSION

THE GRAND ILLUSION (September 14, 2025): Once every few decades, far too many investors become convinced that if they throw a ball into the air with enough strength, it will go into orbit. By many measures, large-cap U.S. stocks have never been more overpriced relative to corporate earnings not only in the entire history of the United States, but for any country in the world at any time. Many investors have convinced themselves that the U.S. stock market only goes up, and have therefore put a large percentage of their retirement funds into the same stocks that just about everyone else has been buying. Regardless of how high these prices climb, or when they drop, the eventual inevitable regression to fair value and beyond will be an unpleasant event for most people who have forgotten the lessons of past bubbles and are convinced that because of one reason or another, "it's different this time."


Many stocks have proven intrinsic value; the problem is that in many cases today the fair value is far below the current price.


Costco (COST) was recently trading at several times its fair value, most analysts upgraded the stock for one reason or another, usually saying the equivalent of "you should buy it because it keeps going up." The price-earnings ratio eventually reached 62.5. I wouldn't touch Costco at or above one thousand U.S. dollars per share, but if its price went below 100 then it would become a worthwhile bargain and I would gladly accumulate it. This would be especially true if top corporate insiders were to become substantial buyers rather than selling at their heaviest pace ever recorded as they had been doing during the past year.


Any stock is a bargain whenever its valuation is substantially below what Benjamin Graham or Peter Lynch have described in their formulas as representing fair value. Earlier this year, especially in April 2025, we had numerous stocks in various sectors including energy and emerging markets which were trading near or below half fair value, and we accumulated as many of them as possible including RIG, WTI, EWY, and FLBR. During the past year we also had worthwhile undervaluations for U.S. Treasuries and TIPS including the highest yield for 30-year TIPS last month since 2001. Palladium was a compelling bargain at all-time lows in real terms and all-time bullish traders' commitments, which we repeatedly purchased via PALL. As is the case with all undervalued assets, they will generally rebound more than most other assets in percentage terms.


If you own undervalued shares then it is less necessary to sell them following a rally, since they will eventually rally again. If you own overpriced shares then one day a rally will be followed by a dramatic percentage decline in order to regress toward fair value.


More importantly, since underpriced assets have to climb rather than falling to reach fair value, it is less necessary to sell them whenever they have recently rallied. If an undervalued asset retreats, it will eventually recover because it is less than its intrinsic fundamental worth. Ono the other hand, if you own an especially overpriced asset which insiders have been aggressively selling, then you will eventually lose a large percentage of your investment. You just don't know when or how.


Cryptocurrencies have no proven worth and will end up collapsing even more in percentage terms.


It doesn't matter how many people recommend cryptocurrencies or who they are, since a cryptocurrency has no intrinsic value. Unlike a stock, it doesn't represent part ownership of a company, and unlike a bond, it doesn't represent a promise to repay principal with added interest. It is only worth whatever a bunch of other people, most of whom are among the least experienced investors, believe it is worth in their minds. It is like owning part of a fantasy, except that you have to pay real money for it. Perhaps there is some intrinsic value for someone who has to conceal their transactions, such as the black market, but whatever this value may be is far below the current valuations of nearly all cryptocurrencies.


Eventually cryptocurrencies will become nearly worthless. As with all other bubbles, it is unknowable in advance how or when this will occur, but it must happen one way or another. You don't want to get stuck holding the bag.


The long-term ownership of U.S. stocks as a percentage of total household assets has been at a median of 26% for decades, and recently climbed to more than double that long-term average.


The percentage of total U.S. household assets invested in the U.S. stock market briefly surpassed 51% in early 2000 before plummeting again. Recently over 53% of total U.S. assets were invested in U.S. stocks, thereby surpassing their previous 2000 peak. It is just a matter of time before the 26% level is reached again. There was a popular myth in 1999-2000, recently revived, in which investors "had to" put their money into the U.S. stock market because there was no alternative. As soon as the U.S. stock market, especially the most popular funds, retreated 30% or 40% in 2001 and 2002, and again several years later, investors had no trouble finding numerous alternatives including "boring" U.S. Treasuries which saw their yields plummet after 2000 and after 2007.


When any asset is rising in price, investors will do whatever they can to own it. When it is falling in price, they will similarly go out of their way to get rid of it. We had all-time record outflows at each of the past several bear-market bottoms for the U.S. stock market. Even the brief plunge in February-March 2000 experienced two consecutive weeks of the biggest-ever weekly net outflows from U.S. equity funds.


No asset has its fair value changed because a particular group of analysts like it or hate it, or due to any other popularity contest.


The price of any asset will often fluctuate, sometimes hugely, whenever analysts either love it or hate it. However, popularity has no effect on the fair value of any asset. That is based entirely upon current and future earnings for a stock, and current and future income payments for a bond. The best time to purchase any stock is when it is the most undervalued relative to its future earnings, and almost everyone is telling you why you shouldn't buy it. The best time to sell any stock is whenever it is most overpriced relative to its earnings, and almost everyone is eagerly purchasing it.


The U.S. stock market usually tracks the real U.S. economy, but lately this ratio has become absurdly out of line even when it is compared with other bubble periods like 1999-2000.


Large-cap U.S. stocks in particular have far outpaced the U.S. economy, thereby creating a temporary massive gap which will have to be resolved either by U.S. stocks slumping in price or the U.S. economy suddenly tripling or more in value. Guess which will occur:



As measured by another useful fundamental indicator, price-to-book for the S&P 500 Index surpassed its previous all-time record from March 2000:



For the first time in history, price-to-sales exceeded 10 for one-third of all U.S. companies, versus only two-thirds as many during the 1999-2000 internet bubble which was the previous record:



Real earnings yield in the U.S. recently fell to its lowest point ever measured:



Like most of the world's most experienced investors, Warren Buffett made all-time record stock sales and all-time record U.S. Treasury purchases roughly since the middle of 2024. Naturally most investors have foolishly concluded that Buffett's amply proven track record is meaningless and that he must be getting senile, since Berkshire Hathaway has been trading near its all-time record discount to the U.S. stock market:



Gold is not currently a viable alternative, and neither are gold mining shares. Some of the biggest drops in history for this sector occurred simultaneously with bear markets for large-cap U.S. stocks, because bubbles for one asset class usually inspire bubbles in other asset classes.


GDX, the most popular fund of large-cap gold mining shares, plummeted 72.1% from its March 2008 top to its October 2008 bottom. Investors who expected precious metals to be a safe haven from a retreating stock market discovered that they lost more money with gold mining shares than with many other sectors. A similar percentage drop occurred prior to the mid-November 2000 bottom for this sector. The traders' commitments and insider data show that the most experienced investors have been selling gold and silver while central banks and individual speculators have been piling in.


Central banks consistently buy gold near tops and sell gold near bottoms, and will always do so.


At the all-time bottom for gold in real terms in the late 1990s, the Bank of England sold all of its gold. The Bank of Canada sold most of its gold below 1100 U.S. dollars per troy ounce near the end of 2015, the last time that gold was so cheap. Now that we have all-time highs, many central banks have been accumulating the yellow metal. The result will be the same as when they had last piled in during the late 1970s and early 1980s; afterward, gold slid from 850 in January 1980 to 250 in August 1982.


Fortunately there is a simple signal for when you should be purchasing GDX, GDXJ, and other funds of gold mining and silver mining shares.


Here's the "secret" to buying precious metals: wait for silver's traders' commitments to show that commercials, who are those who own actual silver including miners, jewelers, and fabricators who make things from real silver, have a combined long position which is near or higher than their combined short position. As of the most recent weekly reading, silver commercials had combined longs of 40,163 contracts and combined shorts of 113,565 contracts. That is definitely not anywhere close to a buy signal.


On September 6, 2022, silver commercials were long 55,823 and short 50,768. That was a strong buy signal. Compare what GDX and GDXJ have done from then until now.


Investors are obsessed with unknowable data such as how extreme any especially overpriced asset will become, or when, rather than the percentage it will eventually have to lose.


The definition of an intelligent Dutch investor in 1640 was someone who avoided the lure of Tulipmania. In 1723, a smart U.K. investor was someone who didn't participate in the South Sea Bubble. More recently, brilliant investors in 1975 were those who avoided the siren song of the Nifty Fifty in the early 1970s. In the 21st century, an insightful investor in 2002-2003 was defined as anyone who didn't chase after the most popular stocks in 1999-2000. In 2028, an intelligent investor will be described as someone who resisted the siren call of the AI bubble in 2025.


There is no need to change my long-term outlook, since it is based upon proven fair-value principles.


I am frequently asked if I have revised my long-term price targets due to the bubble situation. People expect me to say that I no longer expect QQQ to drop 83.6% as it had done from its peak on March 10, 2000 to its bottom on October 10, 2002, or that I don't think that GDXJ will retreat all the way down to 28. I have retained these and all of my other targets, and am tempted to expect even further percentage losses, since millions of new investors have piled into these and other assets only because they're chasing after what everyone else is doing. The more inexperienced people who crowd into anything, the more that the same people will panic out of the same assets after their losses have become emotionally intolerable. This is why the biggest percentage moves in one direction are followed by proportionate shifts in the opposite direction.


My subscription service includes two 70-minute participatory Zoom meetings each week. In addition to answering questions in real time, I log onto my brokerage account and show subscribers my purchases and sales, as well as my current open orders.


Disclosure of current holdings:


Below is my current asset allocation as of 4:00 p.m. on Friday, September 12, 2025. Each position is listed as its percentage of my total liquid net worth.


I extracted the totals for each position and grouped these according to sector.


The order is as follows: 1) U.S. government bonds; 2) shorts; 3) bear funds; 4) precious metals; 5) emerging-market funds; 6) individual Brazilian ADRs; 7) energy; 8) other individual shares.


VMFXX/TIAA Traditional, TIAA money market/bank CDs/FZDXX/FZFXX/SPRXX/SPAXX/BPRXX/Savings/Checking long: 35.42%;


17-Week/52-Week/26-Week/13-Week/2-Year/8-Week/3-Year/5,10,30-Year TIPS/4-Week/6-Week/20-Year: 25.73%;


TLT long: 11.21%;


I Bonds long: 3.88%;


PMM long: 0.01%;


XLK short: 34.11%;


QQQ short: 25.12%;


GDXJ short: 1.52%;


SMH short: 1.43%;


GDX short: 0.24%;


AAPL short: 0.15%;


PSQ long: 1.24%;


SARK long: 0.38%;


Gold/silver/platinum coins: 10.55%;


PALL long: 2.62%;


EWZ long: 0.52%;


FLBR long: 0.51%;


EWY long: 0.11%;


FLKR long: 0.06%;


TUR long: 0.02%;


EWZS long: 0.01%;


UGP long: 0.42%;


VALE long: 0.30%;


GGB long: 0.17%;


BBD long: 0.15%;


RIG long: 0.44%;


WTI long: 0.07%;


PTEN long: 0.04%;


OGN long: 0.25%;


CLF long: 0.01%.

Sunday, September 29, 2024

"Risk comes from not knowing what you're doing." --Warren Buffett

RISKS WITHOUT REWARDS

RISKS WITHOUT REWARDS (September 29, 2024): In this U.S. Presidential year, far too many investors have been acting like seals and not the Presidential kind. They have become so accustomed to repeating the same tricks, piling over and over again into funds of U.S. large-cap stocks, that they aren't considering the risks they are taking relative to the rewards. You can get away with this kind of mindless approach with assets which are undervalued, since undervalued assets regardless of their so-called "reasons" will eventually rebound to fair value and you will do reasonably well. However, whenever assets are at or near the highest ends of their historical ranges, especially when they are wildly popular and overowned, you are going to come out behind even after decades of faithful Boglehead behavior.


It is time for investors to stop pretending that they have a divine right to come out ahead by brainlessly buying dangerously overvalued assets. By the time they realize their mistakes, they will lose half of their money or more. They should instead be primarily invested in U.S. government debt including U.S. Treasuries, I Bonds, and TIPS. Those who own "boring" U.S. government debt will have just about exactly 117 dollars near the end of 2027 for every 100 dollars that they have now. Those who are too lopsidedly invested in the shares of large U.S. companies, many of which are trading at four, five, or six times their historical average levels relative to profits, sales, and book value, will be far behind "boring" U.S. Treasury investors. This will be true not only three or four years from now, during which time the biggest losses will likely occur, but even thirty or forty years from now. This is proven by the historical record following previous bubble peaks which I will now describe in detail.


The Boglehead myth has recently been more thoroughly researched and decisively debunked.


If you invest in anything when it is underpriced then you have the wind at your back. The long-term upward trend will eventually work in your favor. However, if you buy something which is at the 99th or 100th percentile of overvaluation then you will be behind in real terms even after several decades. Edward McQuarrie researched the entire history of the U.S. stock market dating all the way back to 1793 to determine whether U.S. Treasuries or U.S. stocks achieve greater returns, and discovered that their total long-term performance has been nearly identical:


The best-known modern period of severe underperformance by U.S. equities had occurred from the September 1929 stock-market top to the August 1982 bottom. During this interval of nearly 53 years, the S&P 500 lost 38 percent after adjusting for inflation:



If this is backdated further to the previous century, then the period from June 30, 1851 through June 30, 1932 was accompanied by a 21% net loss for U.S. stocks in real terms during this 81-year span:



Of course you can also select numerous periods of time when the S&P 500 Index has impressively outperformed, especially if you begin from a starting point of notable undervaluation. Where you end is a function primarily of where you begin, not which asset you own. There is no magic which will cause you to "always be ahead in the long run," which is one of the most irrational and misguided conceits of Boglehead investors. Since we only live to be 100 years old or less, rather than 10 thousand years, it very much matters where we are in the cycle.


We are either at or near the 99th to 100th percentile for many U.S. equity valuation measures.


U.S. stocks, especially large-cap shares which have been by far the most popular with investors, have never been more overpriced in their entire history relative to current and future earnings than they have been during 2024 according to most reliable measures of valuation. Here are two charts which highlight their dangerous current levels:




The CNN Fear & Greed Index has rarely reached or exceeded 72 in its entire history:



The most important executive orders are the all-time record insider sales by the highest-ranking officers of U.S. companies.


In 2024 we have experienced all-time record insider selling by the top executives of large U.S. companies. This is not a coincidence; those who know the most about valuations and future profits are well aware that their companies' shares have never been more overpriced and will likely never be as overpriced again in their lifetimes and probably not in their children's lifetimes. That is why the total U.S. dollar volume of such selling is roughly twice the previous all-time record and is far above the average level of selling. Top executives have also done the least U.S. dollar volume of total insider buying in history during 2024:



More aggressive investors who are aware of current record overvaluations, and who understand the risks they are taking, may choose to sell short.


It is possible to sell short assets which are at a high multiple of fair value including QQQ, or to purchase bear funds which do this including PSQ if you are less comfortable with short selling. It is essential to understand the potential risks and rewards with any kind of investment before taking such action. In addition, whenever you establish any position, you should always begin with a tiny percentage of your total liquid net worth and only add 125 dollars per trade for every one million dollars of your total liquid net worth. Many investors dangerously overtrade by doing amounts which are far too large, which will almost always give you a mathematically inferior average price.


Unlike long positions where you must surrender your U.S. Treasury bills to purchase those longs, short sellers can hold their Treasuries as collateral which will count almost as much as cash. You will also be paying the lowest dividends in history.


One little-appreciated advantage of selling short is that if you establish any long position then you have to give up the U.S. Treasury interest to make such a purchase. If you buy SPY, for example, then you are giving up 4.75% which you could get on 4- or 8-week U.S. Treasury bills, or similar yields on funds such as the Vanguard Federal Money Market Fund VMFXX, to get 1.18% in dividends which is the current 30-day SEC yield for SPY. It makes no sense to surrender 3.5%, because then you have to make 3.5% in capital gains just to break even, and that's not counting the fact that U.S. government debt is free of state and local income tax. If you are selling short and you use U.S. Treasury bills as your collateral, then those will count as 94% cash positions by SEC regulations. In other words, having 100 thousand dollars in U.S. Treasuries has the same marginable value as 94 thousand dollars in cash. You will thus be able to continue to collect interest so that if nothing happens in one year you will come out ahead compared with those who have long positions in the same securities. Since the SEC dividend yield for QQQ is 0.58% while short-term U.S. Treasury bills are yielding a blended average of 4.58%, the annualized net increase in your account per year will be exactly 4% if you are short QQQ and its components are unchanged in value.


U.S. Treasuries overall in October 2023 sported their highest yields since 2000. It makes much more sense to purchase assets which are at 23-year lows than to buy shares which have never been more overpriced since the beginning of the U.S. stock and Treasury markets in the late 1700s. Current U.S. Treasury yields have declined moderately from their 2023 peaks but remain well above their long-term historic averages. Investors have been shunning a guaranteed 4% to 5% annualized since, just as had been the case at previous bubble peaks including 1929, 1972, and 1999, they are overconfident about gaining 20% or more each year with large-cap U.S. stocks.


The behavior of the U.S. dollar index has been ignored by most investors even though it has been one of the most consistently reliable signals since it began trading at the start of 1972.


Only a small percentage of investors track the behavior of either the U.S. dollar index or the greenback relative to other global currencies. Historically the U.S. dollar tends to complete important peaks and thereafter make lower highs whenever U.S. stocks are set for significant uptrends, as we had most recently experienced when the U.S. dollar index completed a two-decade peak on September 26, 2022 and on earlier occasions before stock-market surges such as March 4, 2009 which was two days before the S&P 500 had ended its bear market on March 6, 2009 at 666.79. Symmetrically, the U.S. dollar index will often bottom and begin to form higher lows whenever U.S. equities are set for meaningful declines, as we had seen on numerous occasions including the important double bottom for the greenback in March and July 2008.


During the past several years the U.S. dollar completed a historic bottoming pattern in early 2021 before rallying to its highest point in more than two decades on September 26, 2022. This was followed by a two-year correction which either just ended or is approaching its final downward intraday spikes. There is no guarantee that the U.S. dollar can't drop further, but I expect to see it powerfully rally to its highest point since 1985 by 2027 or 2028. The next several months should also be accompanied by a generally rising U.S. dollar which will imply significantly lower prices for almost all other assets except for U.S. government debt.


Investors and most analysts have recently become as aggressively bullish toward gold and silver and the shares of their producers as they had been equally and staunchly bearish two years ago.


Investors consistently want to buy high and sell low, and this tends to be even more true in the precious metals sector where important tops and bottoms occur more frequently than they do for U.S. equity indices. Fortunately, just as with insider buying and selling, the U.S. government requires those who trade actual metals such as gold, silver, and platinum to register either as commercials, non-commercials, or small speculators. Commercials are those who own physical metal including miners, jewelers, and those who produce finished products from these metals. Non-commercials are hedge funds and others who manage money for other people. Small speculators are ordinary investors.


Commercials have rarely been more bearish toward gold, silver, and platinum than they are right now, only favoring palladium.


Historically, commercials gradually go net long whenever a particular asset is most likely to rise in price, and to gradually go net short whenever anything is most likely to decline in price. Not coincidentally, this trading approach is almost identical to my own method, partly since I based it upon long-term insider and commercial behavior. Recently the ratios of commercial short to commercial long positions for gold, silver, and platinum are near the highest-ever extremes of their multi-decade activity, meaning that those who are the most knowledgeable about precious metals are the most concerned about upcoming price declines and have been intensively hedging their inventory. This stands in stark contrast to most analysts and the media who have recently been especially bullish.


You can find the traders' commitments for silver, copper, and gold at the following link where it is updated each Friday at 3:30 p.m. Eastern Time:


Here are the traders' commitments for palladium and platinum:


With gold, commercials were most recently long 76,713 and short 416,419 contracts. Silver commercials showed 29,339 longs and 111,171 shorts, while platinum commercials had been long 15,715 and short 45,255. Palladium commercials were long 10,572 and short 3,941, the only one of the four precious metals with a high long-to-short ratio rather than the other way around.


To a somewhat lesser extent than we have experienced with insiders for large-cap U.S. stocks which have sold about twice as much as their previous all-time records, the executives of gold mining and silver mining companies have been recently selling gold mining and silver mining shares at their most aggressive pace since August 2020.


Just during the past several weeks we had insider sales for Royal Gold (RGLD) numerous times, in addition to Newmont Mining (NEM), Hecla Mining (HL) earlier in September 2024, and Apex Silver Mines (APXSQ). In spite of gold frequently achieving all-time highs, the shares of mining companies have been repeatedly struggling to surpass their recent highs and are far below their peaks from the summer of 2020 when gold was more than five hundred U.S. dollars per troy ounce lower than it is now. We have also experienced more frequent intraday highs occurring near the opening bell which is consistent with a topping pattern.


The bottom line: Investors are far too heavily laden with low net dividends and high downside risk for popular large-cap U.S. equity favorites when they should be embracing U.S. Treasuries which yield 4% more with zero risk and no state or local income taxes. Cryptocurrencies remain irrationally popular in spite of having been in downtrends for more than a half year and having no proven long-term intrinsic value. Real estate is eagerly desired for the precise reason that it should be avoided since valuations are roughly double fair value in the U.S. and had reached triple fair value in Canada before modest declines in real terms during the past 2-1/2 years. Gold and silver have thousands of years of proven intrinsic value, but these and the shares of their producers have become perilously trendy in recent months primarily because "they're going up so don't miss out." Commercials and top corporate insiders have rarely been more bearish toward precious metals except for palladium since their euphoric peaks in January 1980. If you are able to handle the uncertainty of selling short QQQ or buying PSQ then this can be a worthwhile speculation, while the vast majority of your total liquid net worth should be invested in U.S. government debt until valuations eventually become more compelling elsewhere.


Disclosure of current holdings:


Below is my current asset allocation as of 4:00 p.m. on Friday, September 27, 2024. Each position is listed as its percentage of my total liquid net worth.


I computed the exact totals for each position and grouped these according to sector.


The order is as follows: 1) U.S. government bonds; 2) shorts; 3) bear funds; 4) precious metals; 5) coins; 6) miscellaneous securities.


VMFXX/TIAA(Traditional)/bank CDs/FZDXX/FZFXX/SPRXX/SPAXX/BPRXX/Savings/Checking long: 37.56%;


17-Week/52-Week/26-Week/13-Week/2-Year/8-Week/3-Year/5,10-Year TIPS/4-Week/42-Day long/20-Year: 23.48%;


TLT long: 11.54%;


I Bonds long: 11.23%;


PMM long: 0.01%;


XLK short (all shorts are once again unhedged): 34.66%;


QQQ short: 24.50%;


SMH short: 1.53%;


AAPL short: 0.15%;


GDXJ short: 0.11%;


SARK long: 0.83%;


PSQ long: 0.04%;


PALL long: 1.44%;


Gold/silver/platinum coins: 7.64%;


FXY long: 0.72%.

Wednesday, March 22, 2023

"Patience and discipline can make you look foolishly out of touch until they make you look prudent and even prescient." --Seth A. Klarman

Trapped Bogleheads

TRAPPED BOGLEHEADS (March 22, 2023): If it doesn't rain outside for several weeks in a row then you may stop taking an umbrella with you even when it's cloudy. As a result you'll get rained on sooner or later. Worse, if the lack of rain continues for years then you may start building houses without roofs. Then you'll have a catastrophe. Investors have been building portfolios in the same manner, ensuring that they'll be flooded and thoroughly ruined sooner or later. The water is already coming in and they're not even putting on plastic blue roofs.


We had such a lengthy bull market that, even with the overall mediocre 23-year performance for U.S. large-cap equity index funds since March 2000, investors who made foolish decisions were generally rewarded instead of punished. Those who used margin, or who kept piling blindly into U.S. equity growth funds in classic Boglehead style, or who simply purchased shares of the best-known big U.S. companies, generally outperformed those who used more scientific methods. Buying whatever was out of fashion or which was most undervalued often did more poorly than picking the popular names, especially in years like 2021. When inferior performance is rewarded and careful analysis is not, investors will naturally pile into whatever is "doing well" regardless of merit. Even assets with essentially zero value like cryptocurrencies became highly desired because they were going up.


Most investors have been piling into U.S. large-cap equity growth funds in 2023 at an even more intense pace than during 2021, which at that time had set a record for greater total net calendar year inflows than 2001 through 2020 combined.


2021 experienced by far the highest total net inflows into U.S. equity funds in history even if you adjust generously for inflation. 2022 would have been an all-time record except for 2021. Not learning anything from their mistakes, 2023 has shown greater average daily net inflows into U.S. stock funds than either 2021 or 2022. The following article highlights this astonishing phenomenon of supreme overconfidence at the worst possible time:



Many baby boomers know they didn't save nearly enough to enjoy a comfortable retirement. Now that these folks are mostly in their 60s and 70s, they have been hoping that the stock market's gains will magically compensate for their savings shortage.


Millions of baby boomers didn't save anywhere close to the amount they knew they would need to retire comfortably. They have adopted the Boglehead philosophy that they have a divine right to come out ahead, and have therefore ignored compelling alternatives. More importantly, far too many investors of all ages haven't been reducing risk by moving into guaranteed U.S. Treasury bills and similar insured time deposits. Most people have no idea why it matters that large-cap U.S. stocks are still mostly trading at more than double fair value based upon their future profitability.


Now that U.S. Treasuries have been paying close to 5% with zero risk and zero state and local income taxes, a small minority of investors have been intelligently accumulating these since last summer. Tragically, far more investors are actually more confident about the U.S. stock market after experiencing a losing year like 2022, because they figure that was the one bad year of the decade and they'll get even bigger gains from now on. The media have been encouraging this sort of behavior, reporting that something like 90% of all down years for U.S. stocks are followed by up years. The problem is that 100% of all the first years of bubble collapses are followed by down years, and since we had experienced all-time record overvaluations, net inflows, and insider selling in 2021, the current scenario cannot be anything other than a bubble collapse.


The longest bull markets are followed by the lengthiest bear markets in a simple case of Newton's Third Law applied to investing.


The longest bear market in U.S. history was from September 1929 through July 1932, or 34 months. This was preceded by a bull market from August 1921 through September 1929 which was over 8 years. The second-longest bear market in U.S. history of 31 months occurred from March 2000 through October 2002 when QQQ had plummeted 83.6%. This had been preceded by a bull market from October 1990 through March 2000 which lasted for more than nine years.


The most recent bull market extended from March 6, 2009, when the S&P 500 had slid to 666.79, followed by the final peak on January 4, 2022 when the S&P 500 topped out at 4818.62. This was nearly 13 years altogether. Therefore, the current bear market is going to be a lengthy and severe one, perhaps lasting into 2025, and with the S&P 500 Index likely losing more than 70% of its peak valuation.


History always repeats itself with minor variations.


In any true bear market the S&P 500 moves below its previous bull-market top. Prior to early 2022 the most recent bull-market top for the S&P 500 had been 1576.09 on October 11, 2007. Therefore this index will have to drop below such a level sooner or later, although there is no way in advance to know when or by how much.


You have to adjust intelligently to everything in life, not just investing.


Imagine that you are a frequent sailboat racer. You adopt the following approach in every single race: within seconds of the official start, you hoist the spinnaker to go full speed ahead in a straight line toward your target. You don't care how the winds are blowing, or what the other boats are doing, or anything about the capabilities and personalities of their crews. It's always a direct all-or-nothing rush toward the finish. You have concluded that tacking (playing defense in unfavorable or shifting wind conditions), observing what other sailors are doing, or anything other than a straight-ahead approach is an irrelevant distraction.


No serious sailor would do this except on rare occasions. Unless the wind is firmly at your back and everything should be full speed ahead, you have to keep adjusting your strategy depending upon the conditions, what the competitors are planning, what you know they're likely to do based upon their past history, and dozens of other considerations. You don't wear the same clothing on a sweltering day in July as you do during a blizzard in January. Therefore, why would you want to invest with blinders on and zero consideration for the prevailing conditions?


While the stock market's long-term upward direction is a meaningful force, mean regression from a rare extreme is a far more powerful force. Whenever any asset is dangerously overpriced it will inevitably collapse before it resumes its next rally.


A married couple I have known for many years love to tell me how they remain nearly fully invested in U.S. large-cap passive equity funds at all times, no matter what the market is doing, as though I'll reward them with bones for being such faithful dogs.


Whenever I meet a certain lovely couple whom I've known for many years, the first thing they tell me is how they're staying the course no matter what and refusing to alter their asset allocation. These are folks who know they're on the Titanic and they've hit an iceberg, and the ship is probably sinking, but they're going to refuse the lifeboats and keep singing bravely on into the unknown. They're already starting to take on water, but their foolish consistency and pride will always trump their common sense.


It's better to be confused than to be wrongly overconfident.


Those who are baffled when the market has been more volatile or disappointing than usual might sell some of their stocks and reduce their risk because they don't understand what's happening. Those who are supremely confident that they have to come out ahead in the long run will keep buying, and buying, and buying, and will eventually lose a lot more than their counterparts. Being unsure is far superior to a false certainty.


Top U.S. corporate insiders have been persistently selling into rallies for more than two years. Since February 2021, insiders set a new all-time record for insider selling relative to insider buying.


Just as average investors have never been more aggressively buying large-cap U.S. equity index funds, top corporate insiders have never demonstrated a higher ratio of selling to buying in U.S. dollar terms than they have done for more than two years. These are the same executives who made all-time record purchases near major market bottoms including 2002-2003 and 2008-2009, and who no doubt will eventually become even more aggressive in accumulating shares of their companies.


However, insiders haven't been making purchases in any notable way since their massive buying spree of March 2020, even near the lowest points of 2021-2023. Therefore, the U.S. stock market has a very long way to go to the downside. Once insiders become heavy buyers it will be time to buy also, but it would be absurd to want to front-run those who know the most about the financial markets.


U.S. Treasury bills provide nearly 5% risk-free interest which is free of state and local income taxes.


A month ago, most U.S. Treasury bills were yielding over 5%. Now that we had the U.S. bank crisis, some investors have taken their money out of banks to put into U.S. Treasuries which has pushed their yields below 5% across the board. These are still well worth buying and I participate in all auctions of 8, 17, 26, and 52 weeks as well as those of 2 and 3 years.


Here's a little secret with U.S. Treasuries: hardly anyone knows about the 17-week U.S. Treasury which was only introduced in October 2022 when the U.S. government needed to increase its net borrowing. Some brokers including TD Ameritrade don't even offer this maturity to its customers, while older computer systems haven't added it to its inventory. You will therefore often get a higher yield on the 17-week U.S. Treasury than on other maturities including 13-week and 26-week; the March 22, 2023 17-week U.S. Treasury auction yielded an investment rate of 4.964%.


TLT sounds like a boring fund of U.S. Treasuries, but I expect it to gain more than 50% including all monthly dividends over the next two years.


Longer-term U.S. Treasury bonds and their funds including TLT suffered substantial losses in 2022, followed by a moderate recovery since then. TLT became so undervalued that, even if you don't count its rebound from its 11-year bottom in October 2022 until today, it will likely gain another 50% or more (including all monthly dividends) over the next two years. Usually investors don't think of U.S. Treasuries as being so volatile, but they were by far the biggest winners of all sectors in 2008.


Precious metals will likely correct for several weeks or more, but will thereafter become among the top performers of the 2020s.


Gold bullion recently briefly surpassed two thousand U.S. dollars per troy ounce. Historically moves above each exact multiple of one thousand have generated lots of excitement among the wrong investors, meaning those with the least experience who are most susceptible to chasing after trends which have already nearly fully matured. Therefore, I expect pullbacks for most assets related to precious metals until we reach some kind of important higher lows this spring or summer.


Over a longer-term basis, bubbles for large-cap U.S. equity growth shares are consistently followed by gains of hundreds of percent for gold mining and silver mining shares during subsequent years. There is a key parallel with the previous bubble peak for the S&P 500: in both cases, gold mining shares began to rally eight months after the top in the S&P 500. The March 2000 zenith was followed by a rally for gold/silver mining shares which started in November 2000; the January 2022 peak for the S&P 500 Index was similarly followed by September 2022 start for the long-term uptrends for GDXJ, GDX, ASA, and similar securities which had all lost more than half their value from their August 2020 peaks (a critical time to sell them) while retreating to 2-1/2-year lows.


VIX has continued to provide the most reliable signal telling us when to sell short during the current U.S. equity bear market.


Some market signals have an inconsistent record or send false messages, but fortunately VIX is spot on. Since 2021 VIX has told us precisely when to sell short QQQ and related large-cap passive U.S. equity growth funds. Whenever VIX is near 20 and especially whenever it is below 19, you get the green light for selling short large-cap passive U.S. equity funds including QQQ and XLK. The reason this works repeatedly is that a depressed level for VIX in a bear market tells us loudly and clearly that there exists a dangerous environment of complacency and a widespread misguided belief that, usually due to a recent extended stock-market rebound, the bear market is probably over. During the 2000-2003 and 2007-2009 U.S. equity bear markets we heard similar repeated pronouncements about the bear market being over, with some analysts making such a statement a dozen times or more within a few years and being wrong each time.


As has always been the case in past bear markets, whenever the downtrends for QQQ, the S&P 500, and similar funds and indices really are over, you won't be hearing about it in the media. Instead, almost everyone will be asking how much lower the market still has to go to the downside.


In recent months I had added to short positions in XLV, XLE, and XLI. More recently I have been adding to my short positions in QQQ and SMH whenever VIX is near 20 or lower.


Investors tend to be mesmerized by the "recency bias": whenever a given asset has been enjoying an extended uptrend most people take for granted that additional gains will follow, whereas protracted downturns cause people to conclude that additional losses will soon occur. This is where tracking VIX, insider activity, fund flows, and traders' commitments has a huge advantage. You will get reliable forecasts while most investors are overly reliant upon the recent past continuing into the indefinite future.


If you're not sure about whether or not we're in a U.S. equity bear market, check to see if women's clothing length has been extended to the feet--amazingly this signal has been accurate for over a century:



Here are some useful charts which illustrate the above points.


The following chart shows that for more than a century an unusually low spread between corporate bond yields and U.S. Treasury yields signals a major decline for the U.S. stock market, while an especially high spread precedes the biggest rallies in percentage terms:



We have also experienced unprecedented buying of call options in 2023 even when compared with previous all-time record speculative call buying in 2021 and parts of 2022:



The traders' commitments for all U.S. Treasuries, including the 30-year and 5-year maturities shown below, have demonstrated commercial accumulation (equivalent to insider buying for futures by those who are trading any given security as part of their career) which is near their highest percentiles ever recorded:




The bottom line: we have two crushing down years still ahead for U.S. assets including especially large-cap growth stocks, high-yield corporate bonds, real estate, art, and other collectibles.


Why did the Fed wait at least a year too long before raising the overnight lending rates? It was primarily due to the foolish conclusion that, since we hadn't experienced above-average inflation for decades, it couldn't reoccur. Don't make the mistake of thinking that, since we haven't suffered a severe U.S. equity bear market since March 2009, it is somehow less likely to happen. Exactly the opposite is true as this extended period without a real decline has psychologically caused most people to believe that it won't occur again at least in their lifetimes, thereby causing valuations for U.S. stocks and real estate to be near or above double fair value and higher than that for many large-cap U.S. growth shares.


Don't live in a house without a roof. Protecting against adversity is far more important than stretching for dangerous additional gains.


Disclosure of current holdings:


Here is my current asset allocation as of the close on Wednesday, March 22, 2023:


TIAA(Traditional)/VMFXX/FZDXX/FZFXX/SPRXX/Savings/Checking long: 33.63%;


XLK short (all shorts currently unhedged): 20.36%;


QQQ short: 7.70%;


XLE short: 4.29%;


XLI short: 2.28%;


XLV short: 1.51%;


SMH short: 0.67%;


GDXJ long: 10.74%;


ASA long: 6.64%;


GDX long: 2.95%;


BGEIX long: 1.45%;


2-Year/3-Year/52-Week/26-Week/13-Week/5,10-Year TIPS long: 12.56%;


TLT long: 9.33%;


I Bonds long: 9.31%;


Gold/silver/platinum coins: 5.86%;


HBI long: 0.27%;


EWZ long: 0.07%;


EWZS long: 0.04%;


PAK long: 0.01%;


EGPT long: 0.01%.


The numbers add up to more than 100% because short positions only require 30% collateral in stocks/funds and less than that in U.S. Treasuries (by SEC regulations; some brokers require more) to hold them with no margin required.

Tuesday, January 17, 2023

"In a world in which most investors appear interested in figuring out how to make money every second and chase the idea du jour, there's also something validating about the message that it's okay to do nothing and wait for opportunities to present themselves or to pay off. That's lonely and contrary a lot of the time, but reminding yourself that that's what it takes is quite helpful." --Seth A. Klarman

Caldron Bubble

CALDRON BUBBLE (January 17, 2023): We are in the second year of the collapse of the "everything bubble." Unless you are in your 90s or over 100 years old and you were trading during the Great Depression, or you're in kindergarten and you could be trading into the 22nd century, this will end up being the biggest bubble collapse of your lifetime.


U.S. stocks, high-yield corporate bonds, real estate, art, used autos, baseball cards, and of course cryptocurrencies are all declining almost the same way that they did following a similar bubble in Japan which had peaked at the end of 1989. As for the U.S. stock market, there are many parallels in 2022-2025 with 2000-2003 which we will discuss in more detail later in this essay.


The most important characteristics of bubbles is that regardless of how or why they form, they all collapse nearly identically. This was first chronicled in detail by Charles Mackay in his 1841 classic publication, "Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds."


2023 will likely have a very different shape from 2022 although it will also primarily be a bear-market year.


Bear markets for all assets usually feature the most sharp rebounds within the context of dramatic long-term declines.


The lion's share of the market's losses in 2022 occurring in the most overvalued shares. High-P/E large-cap technology shares in 2022, just as in 1973 and 2000, were among the biggest percentage losers. From its March 10, 2000 intraday top to its October 10, 2002 intraday bottom, QQQ, a fund of the top 100 Nasdaq companies, lost 83.6% of its value which is more than 5 dollars out of 6. It is likely that a similar percentage decline is in progress following QQQ's all-time zenith in November 2021, with the losses for QQQ ending up twice or thrice as much as many other U.S. equity index funds.


We could get a much higher VIX and a much deeper pullback for U.S. equities in 2023 as compared with 2022.


I expect the S&P 500 Index to probably drop below three thousand at some point during 2023. If this occurs around mid-year rather than near the end of the calendar year, and if it is accompanied by the highest level for VIX since March 2000, massive investor outflows, and heavy insider buying, then this could provide our first opportunity to actually close out short positions and go heavily net long many deeply-undervalued securities. This would not be because the bear market will be over, as 2024 will almost surely feature the greatest percentage losses of the entire bear market. However, it could be possible to make numerous diversified purchases of washed-out securities around the middle of 2023 which could be huge winners within several months at which time most of them should be sold.


Even in the most severe bear markets, you can often make more money by going long prior to the bounces following deeply-oversold bottoms than from going short into the declines themselves.


Remember your favorite kindergarten story: Goldilocks and the Three Bears.


If March 2020 through January 2022 was Goldilocks, then 2022-2025 will feature the inevitable starring roles for the Three Bears. Baby Bear is an apt description of 2022, with numerous equity pullbacks each followed by a sharp rebound. Mama Bear should be an apt description of 2023 with a much more severe parental punishment, followed by a motherly strong rebound. This still leaves Papa Bear's powerfully destructive grip for 2024, of which we will talk more in future updates.


Investors on the equivalent of the Titanic prefer to upgrade their cabins rather than to head for the lifeboats.


In early 2001 investors had been migrating away from slumping large-cap tech shares and moving into energy, industrials, healthcare, and whatever else had been outperforming in 2000. Similar behavior has been occurring recently, with funds including XLI (industrials), XLV (healthcare), and XLF (financials) only modestly below their all-time tops. Last week XLI had the biggest net inflow of all exchange-traded funds. Just as in 2001, investors in early 2023 are unwilling to accept that we could be in a bear market and that they should therefore purchase something safe like 26-week U.S. Treasuries yielding between 4.8% and 4.9%. Instead, they think they are immune to losing money if they are in the "right" sectors.


As in all bear markets, most analysts are emphasizing "looking for quality" instead of diversifying into safer assets. The problem is that they're looking for quality in all the wrong places.


Bogleheads will be Bogleheads.


Near the end of 1999 I was working for a company in Manhattan which offered 401(k) options to its employees. Two of these choices were entirely invested in Nasdaq shares, one with large-caps and one which was more diversified but still highly speculative. The custodian of these assets sent a representative to "educate" (i.e., brainwash) employees on their options, failing to mention that these Nasdaq funds featured fees which were triple those of more conservative bond funds in the plan. They also did typical Boglehead tricks like showing charts of how these funds had performed--but going back to 1982 rather than some other year. I was upset enough to write a written complaint to the head of human resources and copy the CEO, and also to point out that they were subjecting themselves to potential legal action in a future year. They dismissed my complaints as being absurd.


In response, I organized a meeting of my co-workers in which I arranged to give a lecture about how the financial markets work. I was already teaching a class in the financial markets to new employees, so people were familiar with my experience. I gave one of my most eloquent explanations of how the Nasdaq and its funds were very dangerously overpriced. Many people commented that they had no plans to change their allocations since "the market always goes up in the long run" and this kind of commonly-heard nonsense, but over the next few years quite a few people came up to me privately and told me that they paid attention to my advice and reduced their risk.


The most reliable bear-market signals are ringing loudly of further losses.


VIX, an important signal of investor fear, hasn't even approached 40 so far in the current bear market. VIX slid to an intraday low of 18.01 on January 13, 2023, a one-year bottom. VVIX, also known as the VIX of VIX, has recently been rebounding from a multi-year nadir. We haven't had anywhere near the typical heavy net outflows that have characterized every bear-market bottom in history, nor the intense levels of buying by top corporate executives which had featured so prominently at major bottoms including March 2009 and March 2020 and were far more prevalent at minor bottoms such as December 2018. The failure by average investors to be worried about additional losses, and the indifference by insiders in accumulating shares near recent lows, are both clear signs that additional substantial losses still lie ahead.


In 2021 we had greater net exchange-traded fund inflows than during the entire twenty-year period from 2001 through 2020 combined. In 2022, even with notable declines for equity valuations, we had the second-highest total after 2021.



Fundamental valuations for most assets remain enormously above long-term historic averages.


QQQ and the S&P 500 have dropped from all-time record overvaluations a year ago but are still both trading at more than double their average ratios relative to the profits of their components. Real estate has fallen modestly from its all-time highs in recent months, but is about 75% overpriced on average in U.S. cities and more than that in many parts of the world. Assets in true bear markets don't just retreat somewhat and then resume their uptrends. They usually bottom well below fair value as we had seen for stocks in late 2002 and early 2003 as well as late 2008 and early 2009. For real estate we had many deeply undervalued neighborhoods at various points from 2010 through 2012.


After experiencing an extended correction since its September 28, 2022 two-decade high, the U.S. dollar index could be ready for its next multi-month uptrend.


Some undervalued assets including U.S. Treasuries have probably begun multi-year bull markets.


U.S. Treasuries, including their funds like TLT, fell to multi-decade lows in the autumn of 2022 and have begun forming several higher lows. Each week I have been buying 26-week U.S. Treasury bills along with other short-term Treasury securities as they have been enjoying their highest yields in 15-1/2 years. One consistent winner in bear markets going back to the late 1700s has been U.S. Treasuries of nearly all maturities.


Gold mining and silver mining shares likely resumed their bull markets in September 2022, right on schedule.


In March 2000 the S&P 500 completed its top and initiated a huge bear market which didn't end until October 2002. Gold mining and silver mining shares, as measured by $HUI and other reliable indices and funds, bottomed in mid-November 2000 which was eight months later. Fast forward to 2022. The S&P 500 completed its top on January 4, 2022 while GDXJ and related funds slid to multi-year lows (although remaining well above their March 2020 bottoms) in September 2022, once again eight months following the S&P 500 top. Looking back at 2000, gold/silver mining shares were among the top-performing sectors over the next three years and over the next decade. This is likely to be the case over the next several years also.


Gold mining and silver mining shares will dramatically outperform in the upcoming decade with periodic pullbacks of 15% to 25%. Only buy them after such pullbacks.


I have been maintaining my long positions in gold mining and silver mining funds including GDXJ, ASA, GDX, and BGEIX in that order. These consistently outperform following the collapse of U.S. growth bubbles, although they will periodically suffer moderate pullbacks of 15% to 25% just as they had done during November 2000 through December 2003.


I have been steadily adding to my short positions and reducing my long positions in preparation for the next downward trend for U.S. equities.


While I have been maintaining my short positions in XLK and QQQ, in recent months I have been adding to short positions in XLI, XLV, and SMH whenever VIX is below 20 and in XLE whenever insiders are heavily selling energy shares.


We had an all-time record level of insider selling of the largest global energy companies in recent months, so I began selling short XLE near 93 and 94 and have been continuing to add to this short position into its recent lower highs near 90 and 91. XLE has been one of the biggest outperformers since its March 2020 bottom and is therefore likely to be one of the biggest losers until insiders are once again heavy buyers. During several periods in 2020, including the spring and early autumn, we had the heaviest-ever insider buying of energy shares. Energy insiders seem to be especially astute in buying low and selling high.


Here are some useful charts which illustrate the above points.


The following chart highlights that the 2022 U.S. housing bubble surpassed the previous dangerous bubble peak of 2005-2006:



The Nasdaq in recent years has very closely tracked the Nikkei in the late 1980s as all true bubbles collapse identically:



The S&P 500 Index is its most overvalued in its entire history relative to risk-free U.S. government bonds:



Measured using price-to-sales, the S&P 500 has been far more overpriced recently than at any time in recent decades including 1999-2000:



Commercials, the equivalent of insiders for futures trading, have approached multi-year highs in accumulating the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond:



Lengthy bull markets from August 1921 through September 1929 and October 1990 through March 2000 were both followed by bear markets which lasted over 2-1/2 years apiece, therefore likely setting the stage for a repeat:



The bottom line: expect two more bear-market years through late 2024 or perhaps 2025.


Numerous analysts have declared that "the bear market is over" and use as "evidence" the hilarious proclamation that down years are followed by up years a large percentage of the time. This is like concluding that you don't need to take an umbrella when you go outside, since it will usually not be raining--except when it is. Checking the weather forecast or actually going outdoors to see for yourself is much more reliable than going by irrelevant long-term statistics, and there can be no doubt that stormy weather in the financial markets will be with us for roughly another two years. If you're very conservative then put all of your money in U.S. Treasury bills up to 52 weeks while emphasizing the weekly 26-week auctions. If you're willing to assume greater risk than gradually sell short the most-overvalued large-cap U.S. equity funds including XLI, XLE, XLV, and SMH.


Disclosure of current holdings:


Here is my current asset allocation as of the close on Tuesday, January 17, 2023:


TIAA(Traditional)/VMFXX/FZDXX/SPRXX/Savings/Checking long: 34.54%;


XLK short (all shorts currently unhedged): 17.52%;


QQQ short: 6.23%;


XLE short: 4.61%;


XLI short: 2.24%;


XLV short: 1.53%;


SMH short: 0.06%;


GDXJ long: 10.84%;


ASA long: 6.77%;


GDX long: 2.88%;


BGEIX long: 1.48%;


2-Year/3-Year/52-Week/26-Week/13-Week/5-Year TIPS long: 10.04%;


I Bonds long: 9.19%;


TLT long: 8.65%;


Gold/silver/platinum coins: 5.55%;


HBI long: 0.30%;


WBD long: 0.25%;


EWZ long: 0.08%;


EWZS long: 0.04%;


The numbers add up to more than 100% because short positions only require 30% collateral (by SEC regulations; some brokers require more) to hold them with no margin required.